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One approach to specifying the meaning of pieces of languages is to treat those meanings 
as constructions out of possible worlds and possible objects. This technique is useful both 
in logic and in providing the semantics of natural languages. After introducing possible 
worlds semantics, this article will outline some of the applications that have convinced 
many philosophers and linguists of the usefulness of this framework, and will conclude 
with a discussion of one of the most conspicuous limitations of the framework, and some 
ways this limitation has been dealt with. 
Extension and Intension 
Pieces of language have extensions: predicates are associated with sets of objects that 
satisfy the predicate, sentences have truth-values, and singular referring expressions 
designate objects. Some aspects of the meanings of expressions seem to rely on more 
than the extensions of those expressions: extensions are often contrasted with 
“intensions.” In the context of possible worlds semantics, expressions are assigned 
possible-worlds intensions that are constructed from possible worlds and possible objects 
using set theoretic means. For example, the standard possible-worlds intension of a 
predicate is a function from possible worlds to extensions, that yields the predicate’s 
extension in each possible world. (These functions are sometimes called the properties 
associated with predicates.) One standard way of defining the intensions of declarative 
sentences is as a function from possible worlds to truth-values (a function that assigns a 
sentence True when it is true according to a world and False otherwise), or, as a simpler 
construction that carries the same information, the set of possible worlds where the 
sentence is true. These sets of possible worlds are often referred to as possible-worlds 
propositions expressed by sentences. 
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Possible Worlds Semantics in Logic and Language 
The expression “possible worlds semantics” was first used to describe “semantics” in the 
logician’s sense. In this sense, possible worlds semantics is a matter of associating with a 
given logic a model that contains worlds; and assignments, relative to those worlds, of the 
truth-values of sentences, extensions of predicates, and so on. The best known application 
of possible worlds semantics is in the semantics of modal logics, usually attributed to 
Kripke 1959a and 1963, though see Copeland 2000 for the “pre-history” of this 
semantics. 
 
Consider, for example, the propositional modal logic S4, which extends propositional 
logic with two operators applied to well-formed formulas: □(φ) for “it is necessary that 
φ” and ◊(φ) for “it is possible that φ.” A model of S4 can be given by a ordered triple <W, 
R, ν>, where W is a set of worlds, R is a two-place relation on worlds, and ν is an 
evaluation function from propositional letters and worlds to the truth-values 1 and 0 (for 
True and False, respectively). R is an “accessibility relation” between worlds, and to 
ensure the model will model S4, we insist that R be both reflexive (so that for all w∈W, 
Rww) and transitive (so that for all w, x, y ∈W, when Rwx and Rxy then Rwy). To specify 
ν, we first insist that ν assign exactly one of 1 and 0 to each propositional letter for each 
w∈W. We will represent ν assigning a propositional letter p the truth value 1 at world w 
as follows: νw(p)=1, and in general assignments of truth-values at worlds will be 
represented in the form να(φ)=γ for a world α, proposition φ and truth-value γ. 
 
Next, we specify that ν assigns propositional-logical compounds truth-values, given the 
truth value assignments to propositional letters in each world, as those truth-values are 
built up in propositional logic. So, for example, when νw(p)=1 and νw(q)=0, then νw(p & 
q)=0, νw(p v q)=1, νw(~p)=0, νw(q ⊃ p)=0, and so on. Finally, we specify how formulas 
with □ and ◊ are to be treated by ν. When φ is a well-formed formula, □(φ) is to be 
assigned the truth value 1 at a world w by ν (νw(□φ)=1) provided that all the worlds v 
such that Rwv are also such that νv(φ)=1. In other words, a sentence φ is specified to be 
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necessarily true at a world w if and only if in every possible world accessible from w (or 
“possible from” w) is a world where φ is true. The condition for ◊ is that (νw(◊φ)=1) 
provided that some world v such that Rwv is also such that νv(φ)=1. In other words, φ is 
possibly true in a world w just in case some world “possible from” w is one where φ is 
true. 
 
Propositional S4 is provably sound and complete with respect to these models. Whenever 
a conclusion Γ is provable from a set of premises Σ in S4, then every model which 
satisfies the above conditions and in which all the premises Σ are true at a world is one 
where Γ is also true at that world. Conversely, whenever it is that case that, in every 
model of the above sort, Γ is true at every world where all of Σ are true, then Γ is 
provable from Σ in the logic S4. Because of these facts, we can use the model theory to 
tell us which arguments are valid in S4 and which are not: if we can provide an S4 
countermodel of an argument from some premises Σ to a conclusion Γ, then we can tell 
that Γ will not be provable from Σ in our S4 proof theory, for example. 
 
Such models can be complicated to handle predicate calculus versions of S4, as well as 
still richer versions of S4. The model given above can also be varied to yield classes of 
models for other modal logics: in particular, we get quite a range of different modal 
logics just by putting different constraints on the R relation. Possible worlds models like 
these, whether for propositional logic or for predicate logic, have enabled modal logicians 
to see connections between a number of different systems, and in particular seem to have 
helped logicians to get a better understanding of the behaviour of iterated modal 
operators, such as in the formula □◊□p.  
 
Models of this sort have been used in a number of different areas in logic besides the 
treatment of “necessarily” and “possibly”. Similar semantics have been offered for 
temporal logics (e.g. the logics of “until now”, “from now on” etc.), deontic logics (the 
logics of “ought”, “permitted”, and so on), and some epistemic and doxastic logics 
(logics of “it is known that...” or “... is (epistemically) justified”). Note that while the 
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formal structures are similar, the “worlds” in these models are often better thought of as 
times (in the temporal case) or epistemic states (in some epistemic logics). There is an 
extended sense of “possible worlds semantics” where the models for a logic are a 
possible worlds semantics provide they are similar, in the right kinds of ways, to the 
Kripke models for the logics of necessity and possibility. Compare the way that different 
mathematical systems are known as “geometries” even if they bear little relation to the 
structure of space, provided they bear certain kinds of similarities to systems like Euclid’s 
geometry. 
 
Other kinds of relations on worlds have been found useful by philosophical logicians 
besides the accessibility relations of normal modal logics. Many non-classical Relevant 
Logics use a ternary relation on worlds to model the implication relations in those logics 
(see Routley et al 1983). “Conditional logics” like that of Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973 
use a “closeness” relation on worlds to model conditionals, particularly counterfactual 
conditionals. Interpretations of the language of probability sometimes employ measures 
on sets of worlds: this is one way to apply Kolmogorov’s mathematical theory of 
probability. 
 
One thing that it is worth noting about the models used by logicians to investigate the 
formal properties of logics is that these models can be very useful even if they have 
nothing in particular to do with the project of providing the meanings of the logical 
operators and connectives: we could still employ the model theory to help with finding 
counterexamples to invalid inferences, for example. On the other hand, in linguistics and 
philosophy of language “semantics” is the study of the meaning of expressions (perhaps 
particularly that aspect of meaning which is in common across different uses of the same 
word). A number of linguists and philosophers have found it useful to investigate the 
semantics of natural languages, such as English, employing a framework of possible 
worlds. “Possible worlds semantics”, in this sense, involves using theories that postulate 
possible worlds in order either to give the meanings of e.g. English expressions, or at 
least to illuminate how those meanings work. 
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The two senses of “possible worlds semantics” are connected. Richard Montague 
introduced possible worlds into the systematic study of the semantics of natural language, 
and his approach was to take a simplified fragment of English, and then treat it as 
logicians had treated their artificial formal languages. Montague offered a model theory 
for his fragment of English that employed possible worlds, possible objects, and various 
set-theoretic constructions from them, in order to systematically yield assignments of 
truth-conditions to sentences: that is, assignments of truth-values to sentences relative to 
each world of the model. His reason for offering this model theory was to exhibit the way 
that the meanings of different English words go together to produce truth-conditions of 
English sentences. His semantics, in the model-theory sense, was the core of his 
semantics, in the sense of a theory about the meaning of English constructions. 
Montague’s system can be, and has been, applied to many other languages besides 
English, and Montague grammar remains a flourishing research program in linguistics. 
Montague 1974 is the best place to find Montague’s own contributions. 
 
What Are Possible Worlds? 
Possible worlds semantics relies on there being a domain of possible worlds, and usually 
things in those worlds to be the members of the sets associated with predicates in each 
world. So we have possible worlds and possible individuals. Does that mean that, in order 
to use possible worlds semantics, we need to think that there is an infinite range of 
alternate universes, full of merely possible individuals, including strange individuals like 
golden mountains and talking donkeys? 
 
Some have argued that this is indeed the best way to understand possible worlds and 
possible individuals (Lewis 1986). More common is the view that possible worlds are 
some kind of abstract object. Whatever they are, they need to be able to have sentences or 
propositions “true according to” them, but there are a number of ways this might happen. 
A world literally containing a singing cow would have “A cow sings” true according to it 
in one straightforward way. But if worlds are representations they might be able to have 
“A cow sings” true according to them in the same way that a newspaper that contains the 
 6 
sentence “A cow sings” can. And there are other options: perhaps a world composed of 
states of affairs that do not obtain could have as a component the state of affairs of a cow 
singing, for example. Or we could offer a modal analysis of “true according to”: perhaps 
a claim is true according to a world if, and only if, were that world actualised, the claim 
would be true. Finally, a theorist might resist analysis of the “true according to” relation 
altogether, and just take it to be an unanalysed fact that “A cow sings” is true according 
to one possible world but not according to another. 
 
Some logicians and philosophers of language will be happy to leave the question of what 
possible worlds are, and what truth according to a world is, to the metaphysicians. But it 
is worth noting that the answer given to what possible worlds are, and in particular what 
the relation of truth-according-to-a-world is, may put constraints on what theoretical 
purposes possible worlds are suitable for. If the modal analysis of “true according to” is 
relied upon, then it will be much harder to treat the equivalence of “necessarily φ” and “at 
all (accessible) possible worlds, φ” as explaining necessity: we can use modality to 
explain what possible worlds are, or possible worlds to explain modality, but using each 
to explain the other risks circularity. 
 
More worryingly, if we treat possible worlds as representations—as sets of sentences, or 
sets of propositions, or “maximal” propositions that settle every question—then we risk 
undermining their explanatory role in a theory of meaning. If we are explaining the 
meaning of sentences by associating them with sets of possible worlds, then on pain of 
circularity we should not take possible worlds to be sets of interpreted sentences, for 
example.  
 
There are many other questions that could be raised about possible worlds, and indeed 
about possible objects. But for some purposes the metaphysics does not matter. For 
example, when using possible worlds semantics in the logicians sense, whether the 
members of W or the members of the domains associated with each w∈W are anything 
like real possible worlds and the full range of merely possible objects is irrelevant from 
the technical point of view. 
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Indeed, even if we are using possible worlds for the project of semantics in the linguistics 
sense, we may be able to treat them as only formal modeling devices. Whether or not we 
can do so will depend on what sort of explanations they are meant to provide—if they are 
invoked only for modeling structural constraints on meanings, it may not matter what the 
objects in the models are. On the other hand, if we take ourselves to be illuminating the 
meaning of expressions by providing genuine truth-conditions for sentences, then the 
“worlds” and constructions from them should arguably have something to do with what 
can possibly be the case.  
Possible Worlds Semantics for Natural Language: A Simple Model 
Each kind of linguistic construction is assigned an “intension” or “semantic value” 
constructed from possible worlds, possible objects, and sets ultimately built up from 
these. Sentences are assigned, as their intensions, sets of possible worlds: these are the 
worlds at which the sentences are true, so in assigning these sets we are specifying the 
conditions under which the sentences are true. These possible-world truth conditions are 
identified as propositions in this framework. Predicates are assigned functions from 
worlds to sets of possible objects: the set associated with a predicate and a world is the 
extension of that predicate at that world. These functions from worlds to extensions are  
identified as properties in this framework. For an object to have a property, in a world, is 
for the object to be in the extension of that property at that world. 
 
We can provide intensions for quantifiers: the intension of the universal and existential 
quantifiers are certain function from worlds to sets of properties, in the above sense. The 
universal quantifier, for example, is assigned, at each world, the set of properties in 
common to all the objects at that world, and the existential quantifier is assigned the set 
of properties such that at least one thing at that world has that property. 
 
The intensions of larger linguistic structures are functions of the intensions of their 
components, so e.g. we can build up the intension of a sentence from the intensions of its 
constituents. The rule for a sentence of the form [quantifier];[predicate], for example, is 
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that a world w is in the intension of the sentence if the intension of the quantifier is a 
function from w to a set of properties that includes the property associated with the 
predicate. This may become clearer with an example: suppose our sentence is “something 
is hungry”. When we evaluate a world, say w5, the intension of “something” will 
associate with w5 a set of properties (the set of properties had by at least one thing in w5). 
Suppose the property that is the intension of “is hungry” is a member of that set. Then w5 
will be one of the members of the proposition associated with “something is hungry”. 
Which is as it should be, since those conditions ensure that one of the objects in w5 is in 
the extension of the property associated with “is hungry”. If one of the objects has the 
property of being hungry in a world, we want “something is hungry” to count as true 
there. 
 
If we wanted uniform principles about how different semantic categories went together, 
and the two kinds of basic sentences we allowed were [quantifier];[predicate] and 
[name];[predicate] sentences, then it would make sense to give names the same general 
kind of semantic values as quantifiers. Montague 1973 did this, treating names as also 
being associated with sets of properties: “Barack Obama”, for example, would be 
associated with a function from worlds to the set of properties that Barack Obama has at 
those worlds. “Barack Obama is hungry” would then have a world w in its intension just 
in case the set of properties associated with “Barack Obama” at w included the property 
associated with “is hungry”. Alternatively, we could have different rules for different 
kinds of sentences: e.g. we could allow the semantic value of “Barack Obama” just to be 
an individual, and the rule for [name];[predicate] sentences to be that a world w is in the 
intension associated with such a sentence provided that the individual that is the intension 
of the name is in the extension, at w, of the property associated with the predicate. 
 
Extensional connectives such as “and”, “or” and “not” can be assigned intensions: “and”, 
for example, can take two propositions as inputs and yield a proposition as output (it, in 
effect, functions as set-theoretic intersection on sets of worlds: φ and ϕ is true at the set 
of worlds that is the intersection of the set of worlds where φ is true and the one where ϕ 
is true). Intensional operators like the sentential adverbs “Necessarily” and “Possibly” 
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can also be treated as functions from propositions to propositions. The simplest rules are 
these (where φ is a sentence): Necessarily φ  has, as its intension, the proposition 
containing every world just in case the intension of φ includes every world, and has a null 
intension otherwise. Possibly φ has, as its intension, the proposition containing every 
world just in case the intension of φ includes at least one world, and has the null set as its 
intension otherwise. More complicated rules involving accessibility relations need to be 
invoked if more complex notions of necessity and possibility are in play. 
 
Obviously the simple theory presented so far barely scratches the surface of the 
complexity of natural language: it does not even handle tense or the sorts of sentences we 
would represent in predicate calculus with multiple variables. The interaction of the 
syntax and semantics has not been addressed either. But hopefully it gives the flavour of 
how such a theory might be set up. To see how a possible worlds semantics might earn its 
keep, we should discuss some more difficult constructions that possible worlds semantics 
has had some success with. 
Some Applications of Possible Worlds Semantics for Natural Language 
Possible worlds semantics is useful, as we have seen above, for handling sentential 
adverbs like “necessarily” and “possibly”. It is useful not just for an “unrestricted” sense 
of necessity and possibility, corresponding to truth in every possible world or some 
possible world, respectively. It is also useful when dealing with a restricted necessity, 
such as saying what is necessary given the laws of nature, or what is feasible given some 
other constraints. (This corresponds to a restriction on the set of worlds relevant for the 
semantic value.) As was noted in the section above on logic, possible worlds semantics 
has also been found very useful in dealing with the so-called “deontic modalities” such as 
“It is obligatory that...” or “It is permitted that...” and their more natural-sounding 
English relatives, and also for dealing with so-called epistemic modalities used for 
specifying what is known or what is justifiably believed, or what “has to be” or “might 
be” in the epistemic sense of those expressions. (See Kratzer 1981 for a possible-worlds 
treatment of “ought”.) 
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Possible worlds semantics come into their own for a range of non-extensional uses of 
language. For example, consider so-called “intensional transitive verbs”. Examples 
include “seeks”, “owes”, “wants”, “offers”, and a number of others. Whether “John seeks 
a city of gold” is true or not does not just depend on the extensions of “John” and “a city 
of gold”. Suppose, as is plausible, that there are no cities of gold, and no flying horses. “a 
city of gold” and “a flying horse” would thus plausibly have the same extension: but 
“John seeks a city of gold” can be true while “John seeks a flying horse” is false, so 
“seeks” is intensional. If instead of extensions we use possible world intensions, we can 
draw the distinction we need. There are possible cities of gold, and possible flying horses, 
so “a city of gold” and “a flying horse” have different intensions—you could see those 
intensions as being the property of being a city of gold and the property of being a flying 
horse, respectively. Since the intensions are different, if we treat the intension of “seeks” 
as, in this case, a function from the two intensions that flank it to a proposition, then we 
can get the right answer, in this example, that the first sentence has the truth-value True at 
the actual world and the second does not. 
 
One of the applications that caught the attention of the philosophical community 
following Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973 was the use of possible worlds semantics to 
give a theory of the truth-conditions for conditional sentences. According to Stalnaker’s 
proposal, for example, “if A then B” is true at a world w just in case a “selection 
function”, which is a function from propositions and worlds to worlds, when it takes as 
arguments the proposition associated with A and the world w, yields a world x that is a 
member of the proposition associated with B. The effect of this is that the conditional is 
true at a world if the “closest” world to w where A is true is also one where B is true. This 
formal proposal yields a variety of interesting logics of conditionals depending on what 
constraints are put on the selection function, and deals with a number of problems that 
faced traditional theories of conditionals. For example, for “if A then B” to be true seems 
to require more than that either A is false of B is true (the “material conditional” 
account): I am currently sitting down, but it does not seem true that “if I had stood up, I 
would have exploded”. On the other hand, requiring that for “if A then B” to be true B 
has to be true in every possible world where A is true is too strong a requirement: “if I 
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had stood up, I would not have exploded” seems true, though there is nothing absolutely 
impossible about a situation where I stand up and then explode. A lot of contemporary 
work in exploring the semantics of conditionals employs some relative of this approach. 
 
A third important application of possible worlds semantics is in the semantics of 
propositional attitude ascriptions. Sentences like “John believes the number of planets is 
10” or “Mary desires that everyone love someone” seem to require a relationship between 
a person and a proposition: the propositions expressed by “the number of planets is 10” 
and “everyone love someone”, respectively. Constructions like “believes that” are not 
extensional: substituting one true sentence for another in the scope of “believes that” does 
not, in general, preserve truth-value. Furthermore, the behaviour of propositional attitude 
contexts is too complex to just treat “that φ” constructions as, in effect, referring to 
propositions. “There is someone such that everyone believes that he is the murderer” 
cannot be treated as referring to a proposition with “that he is the murderer”, since “he” is 
in effect bound by “There is someone”. Moving to a possible worlds semantics allows 
phenomena like this to be dealt with better than existing extensional frameworks. 
 
The above only scratches the surface of work done in the possible worlds tradition. Using 
possible worlds semantics arguably illuminates topics in semantics as diverse as adverbs, 
progressives, dispositional expressions, the semantics of embedded questions, and plays a 
vital role in theorising about effect of context, including in the development of dynamic 
semantics. For an introductory discussion to more applications than could be discussed 
here, see Partee 1989, especially section III. 
The Problem of Necessary Co-Extension 
Some sentences are not true at any possible worlds, and some predicates are true of any 
possible objects (“is round and not-round” might serve as an example). Furthermore, 
some pairs of sentences are true in some possible worlds, but are true in all the same 
possible worlds, and some pairs of predicates hold of exactly the same possible objects. 
Since orthodox possible worlds semantics takes sentences true at the same worlds to have 
the same intensions, and predicates true of the same possible objects to share intensions, 
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this leads to some surprising results. 
 
The possible worlds semantics treatment of intensional transitive verbs, for example, 
misfires when impossibilities get involved. Or at least the straightforward version of 
possible worlds semantics does. Suppose Alan is seeking a proof of the rationality of π. 
Such a proof is impossible, so the set of objects, across possible worlds, that meet the 
condition of being a proof of the rationality of π is the null set. Now, suppose Ben is 
seeking a round square: again, given the impossibility of round squares, the condition of 
being a round square corresponds to the null set. “proof of the rationality of π” and 
“round square” have the same possible-worlds intension. So we should be able to 
conclude, by substitution of equivalences, that Alan is seeking a round square, and Ben is 
seeking a proof of the rationality of π. But that substitution is not valid: Alan seems well 
within his rights to deny that he is seeking a round square, his behaviour is not that of 
someone who is seeking a round square, and our psychological insight has failed if we 
report that Alan is doing that. Similar problems arise for verb phrases such as “prays to”, 
“try to”, “wish for”, “offer”, and even “owe”—I might owe you a proof of the rationality 
of π, if I promised to deliver one. 
  
Propositional attitude ascriptions also are dealt with badly by the basic possible worlds 
semantic treatment: anyone who believes one strictly impossible thing (thing true in no 
possible world) believes them all, for example. As well as the problem of impossible 
contents, propositional attitude ascriptions have problems with necessarily true contents: 
anyone who believes one necessarily true thing believes them all, according to this 
model, but even if mathematical truths are necessary, they are not that easy to discover! 
There are also problems with beliefs about contingent matters where what seem to be two 
different belief contents obtain in the same possible worlds. Suppose Robin Hood and 
Robin of Locksley are the same person, though few suspect this. The Sherriff of 
Nottingham can believe that Robin Hood robbed the abbot, while not believing that 
Robin of Locksley robbed the abbot. Or so we would ordinarily think. If “Robin Hood” 
and “Robin of Locksley” are rigid designators, and pick out the same individual across 
possible worlds, then the two names have the same possible worlds intension. So, 
 13 
according to the straightforward possible worlds semantics for names at least, “The 
Sherriff believes Robin Hood robbed an abbot” is necessarily equivalent to “The Sherriff 
believes Robin of Locksley robbed an abbot”: the Sherriff cannot believe one without 
believing the other. A similar problem will arise for natural kind terms, given the usual 
theory of how they work—anyone who believes there is water in their glass also believes 
there is H2O in their glass, according to a straightforward possible worlds semantics. But 
not everyone believes that water is H2O. 
 
Finally, the orthodox possible worlds treatment of conditional statements gives results 
that many find odd. Conditionals with necessarily false antecedents that share a 
consequent must all be treated the same, since those antecedents all share an intension: 
the standard line (e.g. Lewis 1973 pp 24-26) is to treat all conditionals with necessarily 
false antecedents as true at all worlds, regardless of the consequent. However, many 
people give different verdicts on different “counterpossible” conditionals: “If 8 had been 
divisible without remainder only by 1 and itself, it would have been prime” seems good, 
but “If 8 had been divisible without remainder only by 1, 2, 5 and itself, it would have 
been prime” looks less appealing: in the latter case it is tempting to say it would not have 
been prime, but it would have been composite instead. (See Nolan 1997 for a case for 
positing counterpossible conditionals with non-trivial truth values.)  
 
There are a number of responses available to advocates of possible worlds semantics 
here. The most straightforward is to bite the bullet: Alan is seeking a round square, 
though he might not put it that way; the Sherriff does believe Robin of Locksley robbed 
an abbot; everyone always knew that water was H2O, and so on. Biting these bullets often 
goes with a strategy of explaining the pragmatics of these utterances so that they are 
somehow misleading or incorrect to say, even if they are not false (this seems to be the 
proposal about some cases in Stalnaker 1978, for example). 
 
Another relatively straightforward response is to say that possible worlds semantics is a 
model of the meanings of linguistic expressions that is useful for some purposes but not 
others: perhaps it is analogous to Newtonian mechanics, which is a good enough 
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approximation when it comes to bridge-building, but not the right physics to use when 
designing particle accelerators. If this approach is taken, it leaves open the question about 
what the more fully accurate theory might look like—but for some projects, it makes 
sense to put that question off. 
 
Another response is to say that a semantics of natural language should use constructions 
from possible worlds as one of the components of a “meaning”: perhaps semantic values 
should be pairs of possible-worlds-constructions and something more linguistic, for 
example, or that possible worlds intensions should be components in a “structured 
meaning” that looks rather like a syntactic structure, as in Creswell 1985. There are 
potentially as many different versions of this strategy as there are components we could 
add to a semantic value, so it is difficult to generalise about the prospects of this way of 
developing possible worlds semantics. 
 
A way of complicating the postulated intensions without bringing in things besides 
constructions from possible worlds is to treat intensions as “two dimensional intensions”. 
David Kaplan pioneered this move to deal with demonstratives and indexicals: 
expressions like “that” or “I” or “tomorrow” which make different contributions to truth-
conditions on different occasions of use (Kaplan 1989). “It will rain tomorrow” can be 
true when I say it today but false when I say it tomorrow, for example. Kaplan held that 
the meaning of an expression like “that” or “tomorrow” had two aspects: a content, which 
was in effect a standard possible-worlds intension, and a character, which was a function 
from certain n-tuples (with components like the speaker, and the time of utterance) to 
contents. Such n-tuples can be generalised to worlds of utterance, or worlds of utterance 
plus a “centre” to indicate which speaker, time, audience etc. in the world is being picked 
out - these are sometimes called the ‘context’ of the utterance. 
 
While Kaplan intended his framework for a limited range of context-dependent 
expressions, later “two-dimensional” theorists have offered similar treatments for proper 
names and natural kind terms. The contents of proper names pick out the same object in 
each world, like a standard possible-worlds intention, but the character associated with a 
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name maps the name to different contents depending on features like which object is at 
the source of the reference-chain associated with the indicated speaker, or the referential 
intentions of the designated speaker. In this framework, there are contexts which take 
“Robin Hood” and “Robin of Locksley” to different contents, and since the overall 
functions-from-contexts-to-content intensions are thus different for the two names, there 
is scope for those intensions to interact differently with pieces of language such as 
“believes that”. (See Garcia-Carpintero and Macia, 2006 for a collection containing a 
number of papers for and against such generalised two-dimensional treatments.) 
 
A final kind of modification for orthodox possible worlds semantics to deal with the 
problem of necessary co-extension is to be more generous with what worlds the theory 
allows. We got the problems because some expressions had equivalent applications in 
every possible world: “a proof of the rationality of π” and “a round square”, for example, 
or “Robin Hood” and “Robin of Locksley”. If we allowed worlds to have the extensions 
of these expressions come apart from each other, these problems would not arise. 
 
One way to do this, which is tempting in the case of propositional attitude ascriptions and 
intensional transitives involving the activity of agents, is to use epistemically possible 
worlds or doxastically possible worlds. These worlds might be more generous than 
standard possible worlds: for example, if it is possible to believe φ without believing ϕ, 
there are “worlds” where φ and ϕ come apart, and connectedly that the extensions of two 
expressions (like “water” and “H2O” or “proof of the rationality of π” and “round 
square”) come apart at some world if it is possible to believe that an object is in one 
extension but not in the other. Or one could go even further and drop the restriction to do 
with our capacities to believe: if a worlds semantics allowed arbitrary impossible worlds 
as well as possible worlds, the problem of necessary co-extension could be guaranteed to 
not arise. 
 
Possible worlds semantics has provided a powerful and impressive framework for 
systematically dealing with the semantics of puzzling constructions in language. Whether 
the theory of semantics it yields needs to be extended by other devices, and if so what 
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those devices are, will continue to be one of the important debates in the philosophy of 
language in the coming decades. 
 
Related Topics: Intensions, Extensions, Characters and Beyond; Modal Logic; 
Montague Grammar; Names; Necessity; Propositional Attitudes. 
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